Part 2 of     

This series of articles applies to the present : the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Nigeria, Mozambique,and the Sahel; where Africa is being kept at war with itself using the same program and the same players…

                The Securing of Sierra Leone: Tony Blair`s Good War

by PD Lawton, 8 December 2025

By 1995, the RUF had gained control over the interior of Sierra Leone and were on the point of taking Freetown. The Sierra Leonean military were proving ineffective, lacking in training, discipline, leadership and pay. Many would later find it more profitable to work by night posing as rebels and living off the proceeds of crime.

President Strasser contracted the South African private military company, Executive Outcomes, having heard about their successes in Angola working for the MPLA government of Angola. They came highly recommended from General João De Matos, Angola`s First Chief of Staff. An Australian rutile mining firm trying to operate in Sierra Leone contacted Tony Buckingham, oil and diamond executive, who initiated contact between Strasser and EO. Contradictory to what is widely reported; neither Tony Buckingham nor Simon Mann had anything to do with the founding of EO. With the Sierra Leonean Government Treasury empty, it was Tony Buckingham, the Australian rutile mining operation and other investors who secured payment for EO`s services.

The Sierra Leonean government contracted EO to assist the army in driving the RUF from the vicinity of the capital, Freetown, and to train and assist the army in stabilizing the country, in particular the diamond areas of Kono. The RUF were paying for their international support and weapons, medical and technical supplies in diamonds at the same time depriving the government of revenue from legal diamond trade. Securing Kono was vitally important as depriving the RUF of diamonds was to remove their power.

“We realised only too well that diamonds were being smuggled out of Sierra Leone, not only by rebels, but also by elements of foreign governments and large multinational business corporations. Such players would not be at all happy about EO`s arrival; after Angola they had to know it would only be a matter of time before they lost access to cheap `conflict` or `blood` diamonds.” Page 459 Executive Outcomes: Against All Odds

Renier Hugo, EO member, who was appointed commander of the mobile strike force recalled the dilapidated condition of the equipment EO was provided with, that being the same equipment available to the Sierra Leonean army, 1 old land rover, 2 worn out BMP-2 infantry combat vehicles and 2 aging Bedford trucks. The EO strike force assimilated into the RSLMF and wore their uniforms as they had done in Angola working for the MPLA government. The EO force numbered no more than 200 men at any time. In many of their missions they would number from as few as 2 personnel to 40.

Air support in war-torn terrain is essential for obvious reasons but in West African jungle terrain it is of paramount importance as rebel force positions can only be located from above. The Sierra Leonean army only possessed one Mi-24 attack helicopter which had been supplied with 2 Ukrainian pilots who were on hire. MI24s are the `godfathers` of air support due to the titanium undercarriage. EO later flew up from South Africa two Mi -17 utility helicopters which are transport helicopters. Sierra Leone is roughly the same size as the Czech Republic, a large country with minimal infrastructure and dense jungle vegetation. It was a formidable task to patrol vast areas with minimal air support.

image: EO members with `Rhino` the country`s one and only attack helicopter

Col. Roelf van Heerden was appointed the senior command of operations in Sierra Leonean. A Namibian national, Roelf van Heerden published his memoirs of EO during the Angolan and Sierra Leonean contracts. His book was published in 2012 `Four Ball One Tracer`. It is a fascinating and informative account that describes in detail the military campaigns and unique style of warfare that EO mastered in countering anti- government forces. The author relates many experiences through which the reader comes to realise the full extent of national sentiment held for the men of EO.

Col van Heerden worked extraordinarily hard to restore trust and societal cohesion wherever the strike force was active. He gained the high respect of traditional elders, community leaders and the Kamajors who were the forest hunters and village armed protectors who acted as the community civil defence force. To this day there are Sierra Leonean children named after EO members as a mark of respect for them.

The Kono District in the east is the diamond rich region with Koidu being the capital. As mentioned, it was deemed of paramount importance to secure Koidu in order to cut off the RUF`s financial support. Before undertaking the liberation of Koidu, other strategies were considered.

“ The first option that was developed during the planning cycle provided for a speedy end to the war by attacking the RUF headquarters base in the vicinity of Joru, to the southeast of Kenema in the hilltops inside the Gola Forrest. After having neutralized the main headquarters, area operations could then be conducted in the country`s southern districts and then move progressively from east to west within each district. On the other hand, the concept of operations outlined by the second option provided for operations to secure the central areas of the country along the main routes towards the eastern and southeastern districts. This would allow the focus of main effort to move progressively eastward in order to conduct attacks on the priority target areas occupied by the RUF. Once this had been achieved the expansion of operations to other priority conflict areas could take place. The final option provided for operations aimed at clearing the RUF from the west of the country by neutralizing the threat in the eastern proximity of Freetown, and thereafter penetrating to the east until the RUF were forced into the forest area of the Gola Forrest on the border of Liberia. “ pg 150 `Four Ball One Tracer`by Roelf van Heerden

Under Col.  van Heerden and with only 40 EO soldiers and a contingent of trained RSLM forces, the military convoy left Freetown. The only equipment at their disposal was 6 operational military vehicles. The convoy was followed by 120 civilian vehicles this being the first secured convoy to travel to the town called Mile 91 and on to Koidu in nearly 10 years. When the convoy reached Mile91 the roads were lined with people who having been effectively cut-off from the capital for years and living under continuous insecurity and acts of RUF atrocities, were over- joyed to see their government forces and alongside them, the South African soldiers. The convoy continued on from the town of Mile 91 to the regional capital, Koidu.

Having encountered a number of RUF ambushes on the route to Koidu and having suffered a few serious causalities but no fatalities on their side, Van Heerden and the strike force arrived in Koidu to be met with a deserted town that was usually inhabited by 20-30 000 people. A roundabout which is the point of entry to the town had been decorated with severed heads with the rotting corpses having been thrown into the centre of the roundabout. Evidence of brutality and atrocities were everywhere and decomposing bodies littered the town. Only two living souls were found by EO and these were abandoned handicapped children who were later flown to Freetown and put in the care of the Catholic Church. The surviving inhabitants of the town began returning sometime after news had spread of its liberation from RUF.

With the progression of EO and the ultimate securing of the eastern region, as well as Freetown, the RUF were taking a serious challenge both to their numbers as well as the morale of the `troops`. However, a new challenge became increasingly evident and that was the complete lack of discipline and morality among a large element of the Sierra Leonean army who used their positions of power to steal from and intimidate the civilian population, on some occasions even posing as RUF. They would take advantage of the temporary ban on diamond mining to work by night in the diamond fields which they were guarding.

Col van Heerden had formed a good relationship with the Kamajors who became increasingly needed to guard the villages from RUF and rogue Sierra Leonean soldiers. Reporting the bad behavior to the higher command or reporting it to the local police had little to no effect.

Van Heerden in his book refers to the ill-disciplined soldiers as `sobels` meaning `soldier rebels`.

“Our actions against the sobels only served to bolster the image and perception of EO amongst the local inhabitants to the extent that they demanded the presence of EO throughout the area as this had become the only way to achieve any semblance of safety and stability. What these actions failed to eradicate was the sobel attitude amongst the RSLMF and incidents and reprisals still took place. “

EO would later be accused of arming the Kamajors who were falsely accused of then attacking civilians. This fabrication from certain quarters of the Western media was particularly insulting as the opposite was the case.

“Our actions also led to a meeting with Randolph Filly Faboi- veteran politician and former APC party member- who was the current Kamajor administrator in Koidu. He wished to convince me to issue those AK-47 rifles that we had recovered during contacts with the RUF to the Kamajors. His justification lay in the argument that the rifles would lend that little extra firepower to the antiquated arsenal of Kamajor shotguns of which the ammunition had become old and unserviceable. I also calculated that I was justified in assisting the Kamajors to defend themselves, especially if the sobels became aware that the Kamajors did in fact have AK-47 rifles.” Pg 203 Four Ball One Tracer

image: Chief Sam Hinga Norman

Van Heerden became exceptionally well respected by the community elders and writes highly of the Kamajor leader, and the man later appointed by President Kabbah as Defence Minister, Chief Sam Hinga Norman.

Van Heerden wrote of him:

“What amazed me as a representative of EO was the manner in which he respected and revered the people. This absolute respect was reciprocated by the people wherever he went. “ pg 229 Four Ball One Tracer

This good man, Chief Sam Hinga Norman, would later be accused of crimes against humanity by the UN-backed war crimes tribunal, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone. The special court was the first of its kind to sit UN-appointed judges alongside local judges, in the country where the crimes were committed.

Africa saw this happen again in Rwanda where honourable and incorruptible men and women or those who knew too much were silenced. We will see it again in the future in Congo where the Mai-Mai and Wazalendo will be taken to court for the crimes of protecting their communities. The Serbians of Yugoslavia were subjected at this time to similar treatment.

Chief Sam Hinga Norman would die after a medical procedure awaiting indictment by the ICC in 2007.

His trial and that of 2 other Kamajors was selected as the first trial conducted under Chief prosecutor David Crane, at the Special Court for Sierra Leone which would prove to be a court of selective justice.

The Syrian Civil Defence Force under former President Assad were accused in the same manner and their Western backed counterpart, the White Helmets, were applauded with international awards and a Netflix airing. (See research of British journalist Vanessa Beeley)

EO member Renier Hugo would take command of the air strikes. The RUF used the dense jungle canopy as cover. Locating the RUF bases was done by GPS coordinates obtained by relentless searching from the air in a Cessna flown by Renier Hugo.

“We made sure these horror stories and the chopping off of hands and the killing of innocent women and children, the recruiting of 12 year olds and putting them on drugs, all of that stopped and that progressed so quickly in Sierra Leone that the population actually supported us wherever we went and whatever we did.” Lafras Luitingh, former CEO of Executive Outcomes

The video link below is age restricted. It is one if not the only unbiased reporting from the time. It was produced for the History Channel. You can locate it on James Peterson chanel, titled : Executive Outcomes – Sierra Leone 1995

https://youtu.be/SBjmSH4VG_k?si=a8YNV54zbe7JKhCq

In January 1996, General Julius Maada Bio deposed Valentine Strasser in a bloodless coup. (Julius Maada Bio is the current president of Sierra Leone). By March 1996 civilian government was restored, with former United Nations Development Program official, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, elected president.

The UN`s stipulation to the new government was the immediate removal of Executive Outcomes and negotiations with the RUF under which the RUF would become a political party and be given representation in Parliament. They had demanded 8 seats in Parliament but were allocated 2. Foday Sankoh was to be Vice President and given control of the mining sector.

By this point in time EO had secured most of Sierra Leone and the RUF were on the point of becoming a nullified threat.

Predictably, the RUF made full use of the ceasefire during negotiations which predictably dragged on.

“As we had predicted, the RUF had violated the ceasefire agreement on a number of occasions in order to infiltrate their units into positions that would enable them to commence offensive operations immediately, should the negotiations fail. Rebel sightings were being reported from all over the country.” Pg 234 Four Ball One Tracer

By December EO`s contract was terminated early and they departed Sierra Leone by 3 February 1997.

“What really saddened me in Sierra Leone to this day I do think about it is that we told the president when he told us to leave, we told him that RUF will take over the government or will try and take over Freetown again. And we knew precisely what was going to happen. And because of the influence on him , you know I would say, close to intimidation on him, he had to let us go.” Lafras Luitingh, former CEO of Executive Outcomes

UK Ambassador to Sierra Leone at the time, Craig Murray, recounted the chaotic farce of the negotiations:

“The negotiations were a grim game. The essential points of the peace plan were these. All fighting would cease immediately. There would be a general amnesty, but not for “crimes against humanity.” The RUF would disarm and enter the process, becoming a political party. There would be a government of national unity until elections a couple of years later. The RUF would have ministers in the government of national unity. They would get some funding to transform themselves into a political party and help to develop their policy programme. They would get offices and office equipment in return for guns. There would be scholarships for their young leadership to be educated. The fighters would be disarmed and go to camps. There would be training programmes, and counselling for child soldiers. A percentage of the RUF fighters would be reintegrated into the national army.” Craig Murray – `The Catholic Orangemen of Togo`

 

The Abidjan Accord was not long signed when in June 1997 Major General Johnny Paul Koroma and a faction of former RSLM military, rebranded as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) deposed Tejan Kabbah in a coup took control of the government for the RUF, abolishing all political parties. Major General Johnny Paul Koroma announced to the world (included in Philippe Diaz`s misleading documentary) :

“The problem we have in Sierra Leone is that there are too many De Beers seeking control of our diamonds.”

With his sunglasses and AK47, Koroma was a typical `Westside Boy`, a cool killer with his pockets stuffed full of diamonds.

The AFRC and RUF returned to their former tactics and began retaliation against any seen as government, ECOMOG and especially EO sympathizers. At this point there were nearly one million displaced persons living in camps around Freetown. The RUF and Koroma faction of the Sierra Leonean military conducted their `cleansing program` across Freetown. Operation “No Living Thing” raped and mutilated civilians and in a week accounted for 6000 deaths.

Away from Freetown the killing spree campaign of terror across the countryside took back control of the diamond fields.

“ The Kono district, where EO had worked so hard and achieved so much, was hit the worst and the AFRC/RUF coalition exacted special retaliation on the population for what had befallen the rebels during the EO period. The town of Koidu was razed to the ground. Not a single roof stood and not a single well was without its fair share of bloated , floating corpses. For the RUF it was payback time. What a shattering end to such a promising beginning.” Pg 242 Four Ball One Tracer

Prior to elections, Tejan Kabbah had allowed people to give their vote verbally, not due to illiteracy but due to the sheer number of people who had suffered amputation of both hands. This particularly sadistic act was all the more barbarically cruel in a country of people who only had farming as a way of making a living. The RUF then turned to cutting out the tongues of the amputees so they could not vote.

A month later, June 1997, ECOWAS, Economic Community of West African States, led by Nigeria, approved the use of force to restore the Kabbah government. The West African region had by then 243,000 refugees who had fled to camps in neighbouring Liberia and Guinea. ECOMOG ( Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) retook Freetown and restored President Tejan Kabbah but were incapable of securing beyond the capital.

The war continued until January 1999 when the International Community negotiated once again between the elected government of Kabbah and Foday Sankoh`s RUF. The Lomé Peace Accord was signed in March 1999 granting the Vice presidency to Foday Sankoh and control of the mining sector in return for cessation of hostilities and disarmament of the RUF. Other RUF leaders were granted government posts. The UN deployed the peace keeping operation UNAMSIL, United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone to monitor the process. By May 2000 the RUF, displeased about power sharing, continued to violate the ceasefire and by May 2000 were once again advancing on Freetown.

“17 000 United Nations `blue berets` were incapable of stopping what barely 100 did in Sierra Leone, 100 Executive Outcomes employees.” – Jim Hooper, honest American journalist on History Channel documentary

The U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright visited Freetown in October in 1999 and promised $55 million in aid and $65 million in debt forgiveness. She was widely criticized for supporting the amnesty and RUF positions in government.

image: Madeleine Albright, US Secretary of State weighs in on West Africa

In May 2000, the RUF took 500 UN peacekeepers hostage and Britain decided to send British troops under Operation Palliser. In June the UN Security Council banned the sale of diamonds from conflict zones and extended sanctions to include Liberia. Under international pressure Charles Taylor is forced to close Liberia`s border with Sierra Leone and renounce his support for the RUF. The war is finally declared over in January 2002 and President Kabbah and his party win the election. Foday Sankoh is charged with war crimes and is killed in prison while awaiting trial. The U.N. peacekeeping forces leave Sierra Leone in December 2005.

Taylor`s Liberia is Made the Scapegoat for the War to Deflect from International Players

The following is the statement given by the Liberian Foreign Minister, Monie R. Captan, to the UN Security Council 4264th Meeting (AM & PM), SC/6997 in 2001. It is republished in full here because it proves the point that Liberia was made the scapegoat and Charles Taylor probably has some very interesting stories to tell if he were permitted to do so. The statement is very interesting as among other matters it mentions the black-market diamond trade was widespread :“Smuggling was endemic to the global diamond industry and was not limited to Sierra Leone.”

It also mentions the `donations` of armaments to the RUF by UNAMISL and ECOMOG forces which is currently happening in other African war zones such as MONUSCOs `donating` of armaments to M23 as well as  EAC ( East African Community) and SADC ( South African Development Community) `donating` technical and armaments to M23.

“MONIE R. CAPTAN, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Liberia, said that it should be recalled that the involvement of his country in the resolution of conflict in Sierra Leone had been the result of an ECOWAS mandate, issued in Bamako. In addition, his Government could not have been an uninterested bystander. Liberia and Sierra Leone shared common historical, cultural, and family ties, as well as a common border. Liberia was hosting more than 100,000 Sierra Leonean refugees, as a result of the civil conflict. There could be no peace and stability in Liberia until there was enduring peace and stability in Sierra Leone and other neighbouring countries.

He said that it should also be recalled that, at the request of ECOWAS and the United Nations, the Liberian President had negotiated the release of more than 500 United Nations peacekeepers that had been taken hostage by the RUF. In addition, Liberia had permitted RUF delegations going to ECOWAS-sponsored meetings to transit through its territory. It had also permitted RUF officials to hold meetings on its territory with officials of ECOWAS and the United Nations. Moreover, the appointment of a new interlocutor and RUF leadership had been the result of an initiative of the Liberian President. Those efforts, among others, by Liberia’s President, had been undertaken with the sole objective of furthering the peace process in Sierra Leone.

Notwithstanding those initiatives, he said, the Liberian Government had been and continued to be the “target of grossly unsubstantiated allegations” of diamond smuggling and gun running with the RUF. On the diamonds issue, his Government could neither deny nor confirm that the war in Sierra Leone was being financed by the sale of conflict diamonds. It could confirm, however, that it was not connected, nor was it a party to, the illicit diamond trade of Sierra Leonean diamonds. If, as claimed in the report, his Government was exporting and selling $217 million worth of diamonds annually to Belgium, the Panel had failed to provide evidence of a trail of financial transactions implicating his Government.

In addition, he said, no one familiar with the diamond industry would agree with the Panel that the pre-conflict value of Sierra Leone’s annual production was anywhere near $450 million. Smuggling was endemic to the global diamond industry, and was not limited to Sierra Leone. Historically, his country had faced the problem, and previous governments had been unable to adequately address it. Liberia found itself in a much weaker position, having recently emerged from a disastrous seven-year civil war that completely destroyed basic national infrastructure. The problem had been further exacerbated by the Government’s lack of resources and personnel, including customs, immigration, transport and communications.

Depending on which figure was used, between 80 and 90 per cent of Liberia’s domestic diamond production was smuggled out of the country, he went on. That should refute the conclusion reached in the report that “it is not conceivable that so much of Liberia’s own diamond production could avoid the detection of Government”. With regard to arms supply to the RUF, the Panel had erroneously concluded that virtually all of RUF’s weapons had been obtained from external sources, specifically, Liberia. At the same time, the Panel had found that, among the considerable amounts of weaponry seized from the Sierra Leone Armed Forces, a “significant” number of those weapons had been seized from a Guinean UNAMSIL unit. Other Guinean units serving under the Economic Community of West African States’ Monitoring Observer Group (ECOMOG) had also previously been disarmed during ambushes and seizures.

In addition, he continued, the RUF had obtained weapons directly from the Sierra Leone Army inventory when the Armed Forces Revolutionary United Council had assumed power in May 1997 and entered into a power-sharing arrangement with the RUF. The Sierra Leonean Government might also have been a source of supply to the RUF when it requested two waivers of the provisions of the ECOWAS Protocol on the Moratorium on Small Arms on 18 and 23 June 2000. The waivers were to permit the importation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ammunition rounds. Given the pattern of events in Sierra Leone, it was not unreasonable to assume that a “substantial portion” of those shipments also ended up in the RUF’s hands.

Continuing, he said that the report confirms that additional arms shipments were received by the RUF from neighbouring Guinea based on RUF diamond sales made to “mid-level Guinean military officers”. It further admitted that the RUF had received weapons captured from ECOMOG forces that had fallen victim to various ambushes. Given all of those well-documented non-Liberian sources of arms received by the RUF, it was “unfair and erroneous” that the Panel would conclude that the primary supplier of arms received by the RUF was Liberia and that such an arms flow was the result of official Liberian policy.

He said his Government acknowledged that it maintained a training base in Gbartala, Bong County, Liberia, which provided much-needed training facilities for its internal security organizations, including the unit that provided protection of foreign embassies and sensitive government installations. His Government was currently engaged in discussions with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to provide workshops on humanitarian law at the training base. It must be re-emphasized that his Government did not train any foreigners at that facility.

The Liberian Government had reacted to allegations of illicit activities on its border by making concrete proposals to the United Nations to ensure proper monitoring and verification, he said. On 22 January, it had decided to ground all Liberian-registered aircraft and requested the ICAO to notify the civil aviation authorities of all Member States of that action. The Government had also revoked the appointment of all agents acting on its behalf in matters of aircraft inspection and registration. Those measures were taken in recognition of the fact that many aircraft flew the Liberian flag without the knowledge or authorization of the Government, which had sought the assistance of ICAO in providing technical assistance to improve its capacity in air traffic control and surveillance.

While it was his Government’s desire to continue to be constructively engaged in the search for peace in Sierra Leone, he said that it was equally true that the Government could not continue engagement in the “midst of the grave allegations levied against it” by the Experts Panel, especially the charge that Liberia had not played a constructive role in Sierra Leone. Thus, his Government had embarked upon an alternative policy of disengagement from Sierra Leone. Consistent with that policy, all RUF members had been asked to leave Liberia and all had done so, with the exception of Sam Bockarie whose return to Sierra Leone had been rejected by the RUF leadership.

Cognizant of the ongoing constructive dialogue between the RUF and UNAMSIL, the confidence-building visits into RUF-held territory, the opening of roads,
and ongoing discussions concerning the deployment of UNAMSIL forces into RUF-held territory, his Government – occasioned by the return of Mr. Bockarie – had engaged the ECOWAS Chairman in discussions aimed at identifying a third country to accept him. The transiting of RUF members through Liberian territory would no longer be permitted, nor would they be allowed to attend meetings on Liberian territory. The Liberian Government was prepared to take further actions to close its border with Sierra Leone, and to recuse itself from all discussions on the peace process, should the international community deem that necessary.

Furthermore, he said that his Government, cognizant of the complex problems associated with the monitoring and control of diamond trading on its territory and the subregion, had decided to seek the assistance and cooperation of the United Nations in putting into place an appropriate mechanism for the control and monitoring of the diamond trade. Ongoing cross-border armed incursions within the Mano River were also a matter of grave concern for his Government, which had suffered four different attacks on its territory form neighbouring Guinea.

He said that, as a result, an ECOWAS Committee set up to investigate the incursions, had recommended that a military observer mission be deployed at the borders of Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone, and that dialogue ensue among the heads of States of those countries. His country called upon the United Nations to urgently facilitate the implementation of those recommendations by assisting ECOWAS with its logistical requirements. Furthermore, his country unequivocally condemned all dissident activities within the Mano River Union, including the recent attacks in Guinea.

He expressed additional concerns of his Government, including the view that the Panel had exceeded its mandate by proposing punitive measures, rather than a strengthening of measures already imposed by the Council. The extreme prejudice of the Panel was demonstrated in its recommendation to impose a travel ban on Liberian officials and diplomats. There was no basis in the United Nations Charter to deny Liberia the opportunity to conduct its external relations as a sovereign Member of the United Nations. In addition, the proposed ban on the export of Liberian timber was intended to deny the Government substantial revenue that funded social programmes in the areas of education, health, and social welfare.

Moreover, he said, the Panel’s claim that timber revenue was used to purchase arms for the RUF was a contradiction of its submission that the revenue from diamond sales “is more than enough to sustain its military activities”. In light of the very serious charges made against Liberia and the concrete decisions taken by his Government to address the concerns of the international community, the Government requested the cooperation and support of the Security Council. That approach, coupled with regional initiatives of ECOWAS, would yield far greater positive results than the imposition of punitive measures.”

source of above excerpt:

https://press.un.org/en/2001/sc6997.doc.htm

continued in Part 3

Diamond Cartel Wins Victory with Kimberley Process (Conflict minerals – Blood Diamonds)